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Adversarial testing methods based on Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) are widely used for searching
norm-bounded perturbations that cause the inputs of neural networks to be misclassified. This paper
takes a deeper look at these methods and explains the effect of different hyperparameters (i.e., optimizer,
step size and surrogate loss). We introduce the concept of MultiTargeted testing, which makes clever
use of alternative surrogate losses, and explain when and how MultiTargeted is guaranteed to find op-
timal perturbations. Finally, we demonstrate that MultiTargeted outperforms more sophisticated meth-
ods and often requires less iterative steps than other variants of PGD found in the literature. Notably,
MultiTargeted ranks first on MadryLab’s white-box Mnist and Cifar-10 leaderboards, reducing the
accuracy of their Mnist model to 88.36% (with `∞ perturbations of ϵ = 0.3) and the accuracy of their
Cifar-10 model to 44.03% (at ϵ = 8/255). MultiTargeted also ranks first on the TRADES leaderboard
reducing the accuracy of their Cifar-10 model to 53.07% (with `∞ perturbations of ϵ = 0.031).
1. Introduction
Despite the successes of deep learning (Goodfellow et al., 2016), it is well-known that neural networks are not
intrinsically robust. In particular, it has been shown that the addition of small but carefully chosen deviations to
the input, called adversarial perturbations, can cause the neural network to make incorrect predictions with high
confidence (Carlini and Wagner, 2017a,b; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2016; Szegedy et al., 2013).
The sensitivity of neural network models necessitates the development of methods that can either systematically
find such failure cases, or declare that no such failure case exists with high-confidence. Starting with Szegedy
et al. (2013), there has been a lot of work on understanding and generating adversarial perturbations (Athalye
and Sutskever, 2017; Carlini and Wagner, 2017b), and on building models that are robust to such perturbations
(Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kannan et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2017; Papernot et al., 2015; Xie et al., 2018).
Unfortunately, many strategies proposed in the literature target failure cases found through specific adversaries,
and as such they are easily broken under different adversaries (Athalye et al., 2018; Uesato et al., 2018). Again,
this phenomenon highlights the importance of understanding the limitations of different adversarial techniques
when it comes to finding when models fail.
Instead of resorting to methods that directly focus on improving robustness to specific attacks, Madry et al.
(2017) formulate a saddle point problem whose goal is to find model parameters θ that minimize the adversarial
risk:
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
ξ ∈S(x )
L(fθ (ξ ),y)
]
(1)
where D is a data distribution over pairs of examples x and corresponding labels y, fθ is a model parametrized
by θ , L is a suitable loss function (such as the 0 − 1 loss in the context of classification tasks), and S(x) defines
the set of allowed perturbations (i.e., the adversarial input set or threat model). The aim of rigorous testing
is to accurately estimate this adversarial risk. As such, finding the worst-case input (or optimal adversarial
example) ξ? ∈ S(x) is a key consideration for both training and testing models. Finding sub-optimal inputs ξˆ with
L(fθ (ξˆ ),y) ≤ L(fθ (ξ?),y) results in computing a lower bound on the true adversarial risk (or in the context of a
classification task, an upper bound on the true robust accuracy), which may give a false sense of security. Hence, it
is of practical importance to find the solution of the inner maximization problem in Equation (1) as efficiently and
as accurately as possible.
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1.1. Methods for Adversarial Testing
Several methods (also known as “attacks”) have been proposed to find adversarial examples (and effectively
solve the inner maximization problem in Equation (1)). Goodfellow et al. (2014) proposed one of the earliest
method specific to `∞-bounded perturbations. It is known as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): it replaces
the impractical 0 − 1 loss L with the cross-entropy loss Lˆ and computes an adversarial example ξˆ as
x + ϵsign
(
∇x Lˆ(fθ (x),y)
)
. (2)
A more powerful adversary is the multi-step variant FGSMK , which essentially performs K projected gradient steps
on the surrogate loss Lˆ (Kurakin et al., 2016) to find ξˆ = ξ (K ) with
ξ (k+1) ← ProjS(x )
(
ξ (k ) + αsign
(
∇ξ (k ) Lˆ(fθ (ξ (k)),y)
))
(3)
where ξ (0) is typically chosen at random within S(x), and Proj is a projection operator, for example:
ProjS(x )(ξ ) = argmin
ξ ′∈S(x )
‖ξ ′ − ξ ‖2. (4)
Another popular method stems from Carlini and Wagner (2017b) who extend the formulation of Szegedy et al.
(2013). They investigate how different optimization methods and different losses Lˆ affect the quality of the
adversarial examples. Crucially, and similarly to Uesato et al. (2018), they also propose to use the Adam (Kingma
and Ba, 2014) optimizer rather than regular gradient descent. Finally, since gradient-based method are sensitive to
initial conditions, it is not uncommon to repeat the optimization procedure many times with different initializations
ξ (0) (i.e., multiple restarts). All above methods are approximate and one generally hopes to find an adversarial
example ξˆ such that L(fθ (ξˆ ,y) = L(fθ (ξ?,y). A “stronger” attack finds such adversarial examples more often than
a “weaker” attack for (x ,y) ∼ D.
More recently, Zheng et al. (2018) developed the Distributionally Adversarial Attack (DAA) which performs
optimization on the space of potential data distributions and ranked first place on MadryLab’s white-box leader-
boards (both on Mnist1 and Cifar-102). This attack was overtaken by the Interval Attack (Wang et al., 2019)
and the Fast Adaptive Boundary Attack (FAB, Croce and Hein, 2019) on the Mnist and Cifar-10 leaderboards,
respectively. Brendel et al. (2019) extended their decision-based boundary attack (Brendel et al., 2017) with an
emphasis on efficiency (which is not the focus on this work). Note that there exists many more attacks (Chen
et al., 2018; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016) that are either weaker or optimize norms other
than `∞.
1.2. Revisiting PGD
The increasing complexity and sophistication of methods for adversarial testing makes them difficult to adapt to
different models, architectures and application areas. This motivated us to revisit Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) as a means to solve the maximization problem in Equation (1). We focus on robustness against `∞-bounded
attacks (i.e., S(x) = {ξ : ‖ξ − x ‖∞ ≤ ϵ} where ϵ is an a-priori defined constant). We expect the analysis
performed here to translate well to `1 and `2-bounded attacks and reserve the evaluation of these threat models
for future work.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We create a guide to PGD, explaining the different variants and highlighting their use in practice. We provide
a set of hyperparameters (i.e., optimizer, step size and surrogate loss) with which PGD does well across a
wide range of models. We demonstrate that regular PGD (as opposed to the MultiTargeted version described
below) can be tuned such that it would rank first on MadryLab’s white-box Mnist leaderboard, reducing the
accuracy of their model to 88.21% (with `∞ perturbations of ϵ = 0.3).
• We introduce the concept of a MultiTargeted attack and demonstrate its effectiveness by comparing it with
other regular PGD-based attacks under the same computational budget. MultiTargeted is a PGD-based
untargeted attack with an alternative surrogate loss.
1https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
2https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge
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• We compare MultiTargeted with other state-of-the-art methods. We show that MultiTargeted ranks first
on MadryLab’s white-box Mnist leaderboard, reducing the accuracy of their model to 88.36% (with `∞
perturbations of ϵ = 0.3). We also found MultiTargeted to be particularly effective on models trained on
Cifar-10 and ImageNet. It ranks first on MadryLab’s white-box Cifar-10 leaderboard, reducing the
accuracy of their model to 44.03% (with `∞ perturbations of ϵ = 8/255). MultiTargeted also ranks first on
the TRADES leaderboard reducing the accuracy of their Cifar-10 model to 53.07% (with `∞ perturbations
of ϵ = 0.031).
2. PGD-based rigorous testing
As explained in Section 1.1, there exists many attack variants. In this paper, we focus on variants of PGD. A
PGD-based attack typically executes the following procedure:
Algorithm 1 White-box PGD-based attack
Input: A nominal input x and label y , a model fθ and an adversarial input set S(x ). α (k ) is the step-size at iteration k and Opt is an optimizer
(e.g., Adam).
Output: Possible attack ξˆ ∈ S(x )
1: ξˆ ← x
2: for r ∈ {1, . . . , Nr } do . Repeat the attack process Nr times
3: Initialize surrogate loss Lˆ(r ) . The surrogate loss may be different across restarts (see Sec. 3)
4: Initialize optimizer Opt . The optimizer ingests gradients and computes an update
5: ξ (0) ← SampleFrom(x, S) . Samples a random input that respects the threat model
6: for k ∈ {1, . . . , K } do . K corresponds to the number of optimization steps
7: ξ (k ) ← ProjS(x )
(
ξ (k−1) + α (k )Opt
(
∇ξ (k−1) Lˆ(r )(fθ (ξ (k−1)), y)
))
8: if L(fθ (ξ (k )), y) > L(fθ (ξˆ , y) then . L is the loss of interest (e.g., 0 − 1 loss)
9: ξˆ ← ξ (k ) . If L is the 0 − 1 loss, the procedure can terminate early
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
Algorithm 1 highlights a few design choices. Beyond the number of restarts Nr and the number of PGD steps K3,
one must decide which optimizer Opt, which sub-differentiable surrogate loss Lˆ, and which step size schedule (or
learning rate) α (k ) to use. Apart from sometimes varying the number of steps K , recent works often use a single
set of fixed parameters to provide baseline results (irrespective of the network architecture). While none of these
choices are necessarily trivial, there exists reasonable options (some of which are explained in details by Carlini
et al., 2019). Here is a non-exhaustive list.
Optimizer. Since the work from Kurakin et al. (2016) on `∞-norm bounded perturbations, the sign function
has been most commonly used. More recently, Carlini and Wagner (2017b) and subsequently Dong et al. (2018)
proposed to use the Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2014) and Momentum (Polyak, 1964) optimizers, respectively. Most
works limit themselves to zeroth-order and first-order methods for efficiency, but in principle higher order methods
are applicable (especially when the dimensionality of x is small). In general, we found that the Adam optimizer
produced the most consistent results (similar conclusions were reached by Uesato et al., 2018) and was less
sensitive to the step size. There were, however, cases where the sign function was more efficient (e.g., when models
used activations that saturate such as the sigmoid function). For clarity in the algorithm description, we categorize
the sign function as being part of the optimizer. As such, it also worth mentioning that any other normalization of
the gradient is possible (e.g., `2-normalization when dividing by ‖∇x (k−1) Lˆ(r )(fθ (x (k−1)),y)‖2).
Surrogate loss. The most common (and closely related) surrogate losses used in the literature are
Lˆ(z,y) = −zy + log
(
C∑
i=1
ezi
)
cross-entropy loss (5)
Lˆ(z,y) = −zy +max
i,y
zi margin loss (6)
3We are actually performing projected gradient ascent steps, but will keep using the PGD acronym.
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where z = fθ (x) ∈ RC are logits (and C is the number of classes). For most models, both losses tend to perform
equally well (which is expected given their close relationship). In some cases, we found the margin loss to be
slightly better (as reported by Carlini and Wagner, 2017b). Carlini and Wagner (2017b) also propose a list of
seven losses that operate in both probability and logit spaces (loss 1 is the cross-entropy loss, while loss 6 is closely
related to the margin loss).
Step size. The step size (or learning rate) can have a significant influence on the success rate of the attack. It
is often easier to tune the step size when using normalized gradients, and most works limit themselves to well
established values. We found that using a schedule for the step size can help alleviate some the weakness induced
by gradient obfuscation (Carlini and Wagner, 2017a; Uesato et al., 2018) while maintaining a small number of
PGD steps. The right schedule depends on the choice of optimizer, model and dataset studied.
Trade-off between number of restarts and number of PGD steps. When compute is not limited, it is always
preferable to increase the number of restarts Nr and the number of PGD steps K . However, with limited compute,
the relationship between Nr and reduce K is unclear. As a rule of thumb, we suggest tuning the optimizer, surrogate
loss and step size with one restart and then increase the number of restarts as much as possible for the available
compute.
For classification tasks, a popular choice is FGSMK which can be implemented by setting the optimizer to the
sign function, by using cross-entropy as surrogate loss, and by fixing α (k ) to a fixed constant (typically around
ϵ/10). While FGSMK often gives reasonable results, we found that these parameters were always sub-optimal
across all the datasets (i.e., Mnist, Cifar-10, Svhn, ImageNet) and models (e.g., WideResNet, ResNet
and other standard convolutional networks) we tested over the past year. Our usual starting point for tuning
PGD-based attacks is to set the optimizer to Adam, set the step size to 0.1 (with 10× decay at K/2 and 3K/4
steps) and use the margin loss. Again, it is really important to understand that, while these values tend to work
well in practice for commonly seen models and datasets, they need to be tuned for each case specially.
3. Method
MultiTargeted is an instantiation of Algorithm 1 where we set the surrogate loss to
Lˆ(r )(z,y) = −zy + zTr mod |T | with T = {1, . . . ,C} \ {y} (7)
In other words, at each restart, we pick a new target class t ∈ T where the set T contains all classes other than y.
Rewriting lines 2-3 of Algorithm 1 more programmatically, we obtain Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 MultiTargeted attack
2a: Ni ← bNr/ |T |c . Keep the number of iterations consistent
2b: for i ∈ {1, . . . , Ni } do
2c: for j ∈ {1, . . . , |T | } do
3: Use surrogate loss Lˆ(i |T |+j+1)(z, y) = −zy + zt with t = Tj
...
11: end for
12: end for
MultiTargeted uses |T | different surrogate losses (one for each class except the true class). To keep the
number of restarts comparable with other PGD-based attacks that use a single fixed surrogate loss, Algorithm 2
uses less restarts per target class t (i.e., bNr/T c). To limit runtime complexity, it is possible to restrict the number
of target classes by targeting only the top-T classes:
T = {t | T > |{i such that i , y and zi > zt }|} (8)
In Section 4, we will see that MultiTargeted outperforms regular PGD-based attacks (any of the variants explained
in Section 2). As a results, it is often possible to lower the total number of PGD steps K , the number of inner
restarts Ni or the size of the target set T to have comparable (or even lower) runtime complexity while still
outperforming regular PGD-based attacks.
4
An Alternative Surrogate Loss for PGD-based Adversarial Testing
x− ² x x+ ²
Perturbed input
0
Lo
ss
misclassified
correct
max(z1, z2)− z0
z1 − z0
z2 − z0
(a)
x− ² x x+ ²
Perturbed input
0
Lo
ss
misclassified
correct
max(z1, z2)− z0
z1 − z0
z2 − z0
(b)
Figure 1 | Panel a shows an example motivating why MultiTargeted can outperform other untargeted attacks. In this particular example a
regular PGD-based attack with 2 restarts achieves 75% success rate (as opposed to 100% for MultiTargeted). Panel b shows a more extreme
example. Here, a regular PGD-based attack with 2 restarts achieves 25% success rate only. For both panels, the areas shaded in gray are
outside the adversarial input set.
3.1. Analysis
3.1.1. Toy example
To motivate the effectiveness of the MultiTargeted attack, we use the example depicted in Figure 1a. This
example considers a one dimensional 3-way classification task with a linear classifier, hence, there are three output
logits z0, z1 and z2. Without perturbation, a single dimensional input x with true class 0 is correctly classified
(i.e., z0 > z1 and z0 > z2). The y-axis represents the values taken by the margin loss max(z1, z2) − z0 (one of the
surrogate losses used by regular PGD-based attacks), as well as the logit differences z1 − z0 and z2 − z0 (which are
the surrogate losses used by MultiTargeted) as a function of the perturbed input x + δ .
The adversarial input set is S(x) = [x − ϵ,x + ϵ]. The perturbed input x + δ is correctly classified if and only if
the logit differences are both negative. Note how z1 − z0 cannot be positive (i.e., z1 > z0) for any |δ | < ϵ , to the
contrary of z2 − z0 (i.e., z2 > z0). As such, within the adversarial input set, x + δ can only be confused for class 2.
The success of a regular PGD-based attack that uses the margin loss depends on the initialization ξ (0). When ξ (0)
is initialized between x and x + ϵ (this happens with 50% chance if ξ (0) is uniformly sampled in S(x), the attack
will converge to ξˆ = x + ϵ , which is correctly classified. When ξ (0) is sampled between x − ϵ and ϵ , the attack will
converge to ξˆ = x − ϵ , which is misclassified. Hence, with two restarts, when ξ (0) is chosen uniformly at random,
the attack will succeed with probability 1 − (1 − 0.5)2 = 75%. However MultiTargeted, which explicitly uses
the logit differences as surrogate losses independently, will have a 100% success rate (when using two restarts).
Figure 1b shows a more extreme example where the logit difference z2 − z0 overlaps minimally with the margin
loss. In this example, with two restarts, a regular PGD-based attack achieves 25% success rate only.
3.1.2. Linear models
We can repeat the experiment illustrated by these examples. We set the nominal input x to zero and use a maximum
perturbation radius ϵ of one. Assuming a linear classifier f (x) =Wx + b, we uniformly at random sample weights
W and biases b within the [−1, 1] interval. We assign the true class y to be index of the highest logit at x = 0
(i.e., argmaxi bi). We consider an input x to be attackable if there exists a perturbation such that a logit that
does not belong to the true class is the highest (i.e., ∃δ ∈ [−ϵ, ϵ], i , y such that f (x + δ )i > f (x + δ )y). Given
the linearity of the classifier and, as established above, if an input is attackable, MultiTargeted will succeed in
finding a misclassified input 100% of the time (if the number of restarts is at least equal to the number of classes
minus one). Repeating the experiment a million times, a regular PGD-based attack succeed only 96.16% of the
time when the number of classes is three and the number of restarts is two. Slicing this result, we also notice that
when the number of confusing classes (classes different from the true class for which there exists a perturbed
input that is classified as such, i.e., |{i |∃δ with f (x + δ )i > f (x + δ )y }|) is two, it succeeds 100% of the time (as
expected). When the number of confusing classes is one, it succeeds 92.39% of the time. Figure 2 shows how
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Figure 2 | Success rate of a regular PGD-based attack with C − 1
restarts against a random linear classifier depending on the num-
ber of confusing classes. For all possible numbers of confusing
classes, MultiTargeted has a 100% success rate.
these results are affects by additional classes. In particular, we observe that regular PGD becomes less efficient as
the number of confusing classes decreases (which is the hallmark of good classifiers). This analysis demonstrates
that Figure 1 generalizes to any linear model, multiple input dimensions and any convex adversarial input set (in
the sense that S(x) is a convex set), and leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Given a globally linear model fθ with C output logits, for any input x , MultiTargeted is stronger
than regular PGD attacks that use the margin loss (or cross-entropy loss) when the number of restart is greater or
equal to C − 1 (i.e., Nr ≥ C − 1) and the adversarial input set S(x) is convex. In fact, MultiTargeted always finds
an optimal attack ξ? in this case (i.e., ξ ∈ S(x) s.t. Lˆ(fθ (ξ ,y) > Lˆ(fθ (ξ?,y)).
Proof. Since the margin and cross-entropy surrogate losses Lˆ(W ξ + b,y) used by regular PGD-based attacks
are convex with respect to ξ , finding their global maximum using gradient ascent depends solely on the initial
guess ξ (0). If ξ (0) is randomly sampled, a regular PGD-based attack has no guarantee that it will find the global
maximum as demonstrated in Figure 1 (increasing the number of restarts increases the probability that the global
maximum is found). On the other hand, MultiTargeted, which inspects all logit differences, is guaranteed to
find the global maximum (since the global maximum is contained within one the hyper-planes defined by one of
the logit differences). In the same manner, we can also prove that MultiTargeted always finds the optimal attack
for any model fθ where logit differences are strictly monotonic.
3.1.3. Deeper models
For deeper models, and since the last layer is typically linear, we can reason about the efficiency of MultiTargeted
by analyzing the shape of the propagated adversarial input set Z(x) = { fθ (ξ )|ξ ∈ S(x)}. If Z(x) is convex,
we fallback onto the analysis made in the previous paragraph, for which we know that MultiTargeted is more
effective than regular PGD. WhenZ(x) is non-convex, the efficiency of MultiTargeted cannot be proven. In fact,
we can artificially build examples for which regular PGD is better, and vice-versa (see Appendix B). However, we
intuitively expect MultiTargeted to do well when the behavior fθ is close to linear within S(x), since convexity
is preserved under affine transformations. Previous work (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2018; Qin et al., 2019) observed
that robust classifiers (at least those trained via adversarial training, Madry et al., 2017) tend to behave linearly in
the neighborhood of training examples. Our experimental results confirm these findings: for complex datasets
beyond Mnist, for which robust models need to enforce smoothness, MultiTargeted is a stronger attack than
regular PGD (Appendix C gives more details). Finally, we point out that this analysis generalizes to any specification
beyond robustness to `∞-bounded perturbations. We can summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 For any input x and a convex adversarial input set S(x), if fθ has C outputs and fθ is locally linear
around x (i.e., ∃W ,b s.t. ∀ξ inS(x), fθ (x) =Wx + b), MultiTargeted always finds an optimal attack ξ? within
Nr = C − 1 restarts (i.e., ξ ∈ S(x) s.t. Lˆ(fθ (ξ ,y) > Lˆ(fθ (ξ?,y)).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 3.1 and the fact that, under a linear transformation, the propagated
adversarial input setZ(x) = { fθ (ξ )|ξ ∈ S(x)} remains convex.
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Figure 3 | Panel a shows the accuracy under attacks of size ϵ = 8/255 for four different Cifar-10 models. The solid lines are the accuracies
obtained by MultiTargeted for different values of T , while the dashed lines of the corresponding color are accuracies obtained by regular
PGD (for the same computational budget). Panel b shows the accuracy under a MultiTargeted attack of size ϵ = 8/255 for Madry et al.’s
model as a function of the number of PGD steps K and the number of restarts Ni.
4. Experimental Analysis
In this section, we run MultiTargeted on widely available models and compare it against regular well-tuned
untargeted PGD-based attacks. To avoid confusion, we denote by PGDK1×Nr the regular PGD-based attack with Nr
restarts and K1 PGD steps that reaches the highest success rate among the different variants explained in Section 2
(that excludes MultiTargeted attacks, but includes FGSMK ). We also denote by MTK2×Ni×T the MultiTargeted
attack that targets the top-T classes, uses Ni restarts per target and does K2 PGD steps. When we omit T , we
target all classes other than the true class. To keep the number of compute equivalent, we compare attacks such
that K1 × Nr = K2 × Ni ×T (when T is omitted, for Mnist and Cifar-10, it is equal to 9). Unlike of regular
PGDK1×Nr (which we tune using grid-search) – and because we did not find MultiTargeted to be as sensitive to
hyperparameters as other PGD-based attacks – we fix MTK2×Ni×T to use Adam as its optimizer, set the initial step
size at 0.1 and reduce it to 0.01 and 0.001 after K2/2 and 3K2/4 steps, respectively (this schedule is also included
in the grid-search performed on regular PGD).
Cifar-10. We focus our analysis on four models. All models are WideResNet variants. The first is adversarially
trained by Madry et al. (trained against ϵ = 8/255) and is available from MadryLab’s white-box Cifar-10
leaderboard.4 The second model is trained using TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019) and is available on the TRADES
leaderboard.5 It is empirically more robust than the first network. The third model is trained using Unsupervised
Adversarial Training (UAT, Uesato et al., 2019) and is empirically more robust than the other two models but is
three times deeper (with 106 layers). The last model is adversarially trained by us using the learning rate schedule
proposed by Zhang et al. (2019). This model is as robust as the Zhang et al.’s model under regular PGD-based
attacks.
Figure 3a shows the accuracy reached by MultiTargeted as a function of the number of target classes T at
ϵ = 8/255. It compares MT200×20×T with PGD200×(20·T ). For all models, MultiTargeted is the strongest attack.
In fact, even when targeting only the top-2 classes, MultiTargeted significantly outperforms regular PGD on all
models (except Madry et al.’s model). We also observe that the performance of regular PGD stagnates and that
adding more restarts is ineffective, which appears to confirm that for some examples in the test set there is a low
probability of finding an initial guess ξ (0) that leads to misclassified perturbation (as examplified in Figure 1b).
For completeness, Figure 3b shows how the accuracy under an MTK×Ni attack evolves as a function of the number
of PGD steps K and the number of restarts Ni. We note that, while this figure shows specifically what happens on
Madry et al.’s model, the behavior is identical on the other three Cifar-10 models. As expected, the strength of
4https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge; the model used here is the adv_trained model.
5https://github.com/yaodongyu/TRADES
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Figure 4 | Accuracy under attacks of size ϵ = 16/255 for three
different ImageNet models. The solid lines are the accuracies
obtained by MultiTargeted for different values of T , while the
dashed lines of the corresponding color are accuracies obtained
by regular PGD (for the same computational budget).
the attack saturates with more restarts and steps. We also observe that MultiTargeted with a single restart is
more effective than a regular PGD-based attack with hundreds of restarts.
Finally, Table 1, at the end of this section, summarizes the performance of each attack on models that have an
online leaderboard (i.e., Madry et al.’s and Zhang et al.’s models). For both models, MultiTargeted ranks first.
ImageNet. We focus our analysis on three models. All models are adversarially trained against random
targeted attacks at ϵ = 16/255 (as is usual on ImageNet). However, they all exhibit non-trivial empirical
robustness to untargeted attacks; and we evaluate them in that context (as MultiTargeted is an untargeted
attack). The first model is a standard ResNet-152: it is available from Xie et al.’s GitHub page.6 The second model
is a variant of ResNet-152 that uses additional “denoise” blocks: it is also trained by Xie et al. (2018). The third
model is trained by ourselves: we put emphasis on robustness under attack rather than accuracy on clean examples.
As a result (on the first 1000 images of the test set) the last model has a clean accuracy of 51.4% compared to
66.8% for the “denoise” model and 64.1% for the regular model by Xie et al..
Figure 4 shows the accuracy reached by MultiTargeted as a function of the number of target classes T at
ϵ = 16/255. It compare MT200×20×T with PGD200×(20·T ). For all models MultiTargeted is a better attack (yielding
lower accuracy) starting with T = 2. Another interesting observation is the fact that under the MultiTargeted
attack, the standard and “denoise” variants trained by Xie et al. are on par (the regular PGD-based attack would
indicate otherwise).7 This confirms the observation made in Section 3.1. Indeed, Xie et al. (2018) demonstrate
that under random targeted attacks the “denoise” model is stronger. As such, there are less confusing classes,
which can explain why MultiTargeted is performing well in comparison to regular PGD on the “denoise” model.
Leaderboards on Mnist and Cifar-10. In this section, we introduce a combined PGD+MTK×Ni attack that
alternates between the logit differences shown in Equation (7) and the margin loss in Equation (6). Thus, for
Mnist and Cifar-10, where the number of classes is ten, the total number of surrogate losses is ten and
thusthe total number of gradient evaluation is K × Ni × 10 (which results in using about 11% more compute that
MultiTargeted). Algorithm 3 in the supplementary material shows an implementation of this attack.
For Mnist, we analyze the model adversarially trained by Madry et al. (trained against ϵ = 0.3). It is available
from MadryLab’s white-box Mnist leaderboard.8 On the leaderboard, it states that this model achieves 89.62%
accuracy under PGD100×50. With proper tuning, our implementation of PGD100×50 reaches 89.03% accuracy, which
is closer to the state-of-art results obtained by Wang et al. (2019) with 88.42%. For Cifar-10, we re-analyze
two WideResNet models. The first model from Madry et al. is available on MadryLab’s leaderboard,9 where it
achieves 45.21% accuracy under PGD20×10 (at ϵ = 8/255). Our tuned PGD20×10 variant reaches a similar accuracy
6https://github.com/facebookresearch/ImageNet-Adversarial-Training
7This analysis is performed using an untargeted attack and these conclusions are not necessarily at odds with the results shown by Xie et al.
(2018), which looks at random targeted attacks.
8https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge; the model used here is the secret model.
9https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge; the model used here is the secret model.
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Accuracy under attack
Mnist ϵ PGD1000×1800 MT1000×200 PGD+MT1000×200 Aggregated Wang et al.
Madry et al. 0.3 88.21% 88.43% 88.36% 88.18% 88.42%
Cifar-10 ϵ PGD1000×180 MT1000×20 PGD+MT1000×20 Aggregated Croce and Hein
Madry et al. 8/255 44.51% 44.05% 44.03% 44.03% 44.51%
Zhang et al. 0.031 53.70% 53.07% 53.07% 53.05% 53.44%
Table 1 | Comparison with state-of-the-art attacks. On Mnist (top-half of the table), the best known attack is the “Interval Attack” by Wang
et al. (2019). On Cifar-10 (bottom-half of the table), the best known attack is the “Fast Adaptive Boundary Attack” by Croce and Hein
(2019). For both dataset, we compare regular PGD with MultiTargeted. The penultimate column is the accuracy obtained when combining
all attacks into one (i.e., picking the worst-case adversarial example from any of the attacks).
of 45.18% and the state-of-the-art is obtained by Croce and Hein (2019) with 44.51%. The second model of Zhang
et al. is from the TRADES leaderboard, where it states that FGSM1000 reaches 56.53% in accuracy (at ϵ = 0.031).
Our tuned PGD50×20 variant reaches 54.05% accuracy. The state-of-the-art obtained by Croce and Hein is 53.44%.
Table 1 summarizes the results. Overall, this table illustrates well the dichotomy and complementary of regular
PGD and MultiTargeted (see Section 3). On Mnist, for the same number of gradient evaluations, regular PGD
tends to do better than MultiTargeted – while on Cifar-10, it is the opposite. These results do seem to indicate
that, for Madry et al.’s Mnist model, the number of restarts is much more important than the choice of surrogate
loss. As explained in Appendix C, this model does not behave linearly and is not smooth in the neighborhood of
datapoints. As such, the propagated adversarial input setZ(x) can be highly non-convex and, thus, more restarts
are required to avoid local minima. In fact, combining both regular PGD and MultiTargeted into a PGD+MT
attack does not provide a significant advantage (beyond adding a few additional restarts). On both Mnist and
Cifar-10, MT itself achieves state-of-the-art numbers. For both datasets, the best attack misses only a handful of
adversarial examples (as visible by the small gap in accuracy with the “aggregated” column, which aggregates
results across the three attack variants).
5. Conclusion
This paper provides an overview of projected gradient descent and its use for rigorous testing. We introduce the
concept of MultiTargeted attacks, which is a variant of PGD, and demonstrate that we can reach state-of-art
results on three separate leaderboards. We highlight under which conditions MultiTargeted is more effective.
We hope that this paper can serve as an inspiration for tuning PGD-based attacks and motivates why we should
not necessarily rely on existing hyper-parameter values.
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A. Combining regular PGD and MultiTargeted
As shown in Section 3, there exists cases where the margin loss is more efficient than using each logit difference (as
proposed by MultiTargeted). Algorithm 3 below combines both approaches into a single PGD+MTK×Ni attack.
Algorithm 3 PGD+MT attack
Input: A nominal input x and label y, a model fθ (x) and a threat model S(x)
Output: Possible attack ξˆ ∈ S(x)
1: T ← {1, . . . ,C} \ {y} . C is the number of classes.
2: for i ∈ {1, . . . ,Ni} do
3: for j ∈ {1, . . . ,C} do
4: if j = C then
5: Use surrogate loss Lˆ(iC+j+1)(z,y) = −zy +maxt ∈T zt . margin loss
6: else
7: Use surrogate loss Lˆ(iC+j+1)(z,y) = −zy + zt with t = Tj . logit difference losses
8: end if
9: Initialize optimizer Opt
10: ξ (0) ← SampleFrom(x ,S)
11: for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} do
12: ξ (k ) ← ProjS(x )
(
ξ (k−1) + αkOpt
(
∇ξ (k−1) Lˆ(r )(fθ (ξ (k−1)),y)
))
13: if L(fθ (ξ (k )),y) > L(fθ (ξˆ ,y) then
14: ξˆ ← ξ (k )
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: end for
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B. Non-convex adversarial input sets
This section shows why, under non-convex adversarial input sets, MultiTargeted is not necessarily more efficient
than regular PGD-based attacks – even for linear models (for the same compute budget). Let us consider a 2
dimensional input x and a 3-way classification task. Figure 5 shows the margin loss for two slightly different settings.
For all panels, the adversarial input set is highlighted in blue and the region in purple is where misclassification
occurs. When ξ (0) is sampled within the region highlighted in red, the attack for which that panel corresponds to
is successful.
At the top, in Figure 5a and b, we illustrate an example for which regular PGD using the margin loss is more
likely to find the worst-case attack (located in the top-right corner). Indeed, the region in red is larger in panel b
than in panel a. On the other hand, in Figure 5c and d, we illustrate the opposite. A slight shift of the input makes
regular PGD less likely to find the optimal perturbation.
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(d) Example 2 for regular PGD
Figure 5 | Examples with non-convex adversarial input sets. For all panels, the adversarial input set is highlighted in blue and the region in
purple is where misclassification occurs. The solid line in black defines the boundary where the input is classified as class 2. The dashed line is
where the two plane z1 − z0 and z2 − z0 intersect. When ξ (0) is sampled within the region highlighted in red, the attack for which that panel
corresponds to is successful. At the top, we have an example for which regular PGD is more successful. At the bottom, we have an example for
which MultiTargeted is more successful.
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C. Effect of linearity
As discussed in Section 3, the effectiveness of MultiTargeted is dependent on the how the adversarial input
set propagates through the network fθ . In particular, if the propagated set Z(x) = { fθ (ξ )|ξ ∈ S(x)} is convex,
MultiTargeted is at least as effective as a regular PGD-based attack using the margin or cross-entropy loss (i.e., it
always succeeds in finding the optimal attack given enough restarts, see Theorem 3.2). When the adversarial input
set S(x) is convex, it is important to characterize the local behavior of fθ around the nominal input x . Indeed, if
fθ behaves linearly thenZ(x) is convex. Our hypothesis is that when the fθ is “close” to linear MultiTargeted
is more effective. To analyze the behavior of a given model, we gather the gradients of all logits with respect to
hundred randomly selected inputs around examples from the test set. When the singular values of the matrix that
gathers these gradient are mostly concentrated around a few direction, the model should behave more linearly (in
the extreme case where a single singular value is non-zero, the model is linear).
Figure 6a shows the singular values of three Mnist models. The first two models, denoted “Madry et al.”
and “Ours” are adversarially trained model of the same size (i.e., two convolutional layers followed by two fully
connected layers). The last model, denoted by “Ours (small)” is a much smaller model (also adversarially trained).
We observe that the smaller model tends to behave more linearly. This is also qualitatively shown in Figure 7 that
shows how the logits change as a function of the input. Table 2 confirms that under the same compute budget
MultiTargeted works better on the smaller, more locally linear, model. For less linear models, it is important
to use more restarts and, as such, it is preferential to use a single loss (e.g., margin or cross-entropy loss) and
increase the number of restarts. We highlight that, when given more restarts per target class, MultiTargeted can
reach the same performance as regular PGD.
In comparison, Figure 6b shows the singular values of three Cifar-10 models. We noticed in Section 4 that
MultiTargeted is significantly better than regular PGD on robustly trained Cifar-10 models. This plot confirms
that these models behave almost linearly (in the local neighborhood of datapoints). This is also qualitatively shown
in Figure 8 that shows how the logits change as a function of the input for these models.
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Figure 6 | Ordered singular values of a matrix gathering the gradients of each logit with respect to hundred randomly selected inputs within the
adversarial input set around ten test datapoints (the thicker line represents the average over logits and datapoints). All values are normalized
by the largest singular value. As the behavior of the model becomes more linear, we expect the curve to become steeper. Panel a shows the
singular values of three Mnist models. We observe that the smallest model behaves more linearly than the other two models. Panel b shows
the singular values of three Cifar-10 models. We observe that Cifar-10 models tend to behave more linearly than Mnist models.
Accuracy under attack
Mnist ϵ PGD1000×180 MT1000×20 MT1000×180
Madry et al. 0.3 88.49% 88.89% 88.45%
Ours 0.3 91.98% 92.96% 92.05%
Ours (small) 0.3 74.13% 73.56% 73.11%
Table 2 | Comparison of MultiTargeted and regular PGD on three Mnist models. MultiTargeted is more effective on the smaller model.
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D. Reproducibility
The code relevant to this publication is available as part of the Interval Bound Propagation library at https:
//github.com/deepmind/interval-bound-propagation under src/attacks.py.
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Figure 7 | Logit landscapes around the nominal image of a “seven” (first image from the Mnist test set). It is generated by varying the input
to the model, starting from the original input image toward either the worst attack found using PGD (u direction) or a random Rademacher
direction (v direction). Panels show the contour plots of different logits: from left to right, we have logits z7, z0 and z1; from top to bottom,
we have the Madry et al.’s model, our own adversarially trained model of similar size and our smaller adversarially trained model. The
diamond-shape represents the projected `∞ ball of size ϵ = 0.3 around the nominal image. We observe that within this adversarial input set,
the smaller model tends to behave more linearly than the other two models.
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Figure 8 | Logit landscapes around the nominal image of a “truck” (first image from the Cifar-10 test set). It is generated by varying
the input to the model, starting from the original input image toward either the worst attack found using PGD (u direction) or a random
Rademacher direction (v direction). Panels show the contour plots of different logits: from left to right, we have logits z9, z0 and z1; from top
to bottom, we have the Madry et al.’s model, Zhang et al.’s model and our own adversarially trained model of similar size. The diamond-shape
represents the projected `∞ ball of size ϵ = 8/255 around the nominal image. We observe that within this adversarial input set, all models
tend to behave linearly.
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